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Introduction 
 
For most of the current era of European integration, the Court of Justice has not admitted 
preparatory work as evidence of the frames’ intent when interpreting Treaties. Even the 
teleology of ‘ever closer union’, as radical as its application has been, is firmly rooted in the 
text of the Treaties. Literature suggests this was linked to the secrecy surrounding early 
negotiations, and poor public access to the documents. Some at the Court have considered 
that these concerns are no longer relevant to the preparatory work to more recent Treaties. In 
several recent cases, the Court has reversed its initial opposition to relying on preparatory 
works to the Treaties. In these judgments, the travaux préparatoires have not offered merely 
superfluous additional arguments. We examine the extent to which the Court and the 
Advocates General have relied preparatory work to interpret the Treaties and determine the 
‘intent’ of their framers. The references, whilst introducing a new source for legal 
interpretation, do not result in dynamic constitution-building. Rather, they reinforce static 
interpretations of existing provisions. Nevertheless, the possibility that this doctrine will 
develop into a more dynamic one calls for further research on their proper role in the 
interpretative process. If preparatory works should now routinely be accepted, on which 
precedents should the Court’s rules be modeled? 
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The legal context of preparatory work in international and EU law 
 
International Law permits reference to travaux 
Reference to the preparatory works of Treaties is expressly foreseen in international law. The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
3
, particularly articles 31 and 32 set the rules of 
interpretation of international treaties. According to Article 31 VCLT
4
, the terms of the treaty 
should be given the ordinary meaning in their context and be interpreted in the light of its 
object and purpose. The purpose of the treaty can be found from the text, the preamble, and 
the annexes. Article 32 VCLT
5
 contains that the preparatory work of the treaty can be used as 
supplementary means of interpretation to confirm or determine the meaning, or when the 
interpretation according to Article 31 VCLT either leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure 
or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. In the Vienna Convention, the 
travaux préparatoires are given a supporting role in the interpretation of the international 
treaties. However, the intent, or the object and purpose as it is put in the Article 31, is given 
decisive role.  
The actual object of interpretation is the text of the treaties. The first step of the interpretation 
is to intuitively assume the “ordinary meaning” of the text. After this, supplementary means 
of interpretation can be used to confirm or revise the original hypothesis. The preparatory 
works can have influence in the interpretation through four routes: if the meaning of text is 
left ambiguous (article 32.a), the interpretation would leave to manifestly absurd or 
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unreasonable result (article 32.b), the parties have intended to give a term a special meaning 
(article 31.4), or merely to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31 
(article 32). Through this last mentioned means, the confirmation of textual and contextual 
interpretation, the travaux préparatoires can be relied in every case of interpretation.
6
  
..but EU law is sui generis 
 
The applicability of the VCLT has two dimensions in the EU context. The Court has found 
that the VCLT binds the EU institutions and is part of EU legal order as a rule of customary 
international law.
7
 This line of case law indicates that the EU institutions need to respect the 
rules of interpretation stipulated in the VCLT when they are interpreting international 
treaties. However, the VCLT does not apply to the interpretation of the EU law itself. The 
CJEU has found that the EU law is not in this respect ordinary international law. In Opinion 
1/91 the Court contrasted the agreement establishing a European Economic Area (EEA) to 
the Union law,
8
 and stated that Community law forms a Community legal order, whose aims 
are not just to “achieve economic integration”, but to make “concrete progress towards 
European unity”. Thus, Union9 law operates, according to the Court of Justice, in a different 
context, because it does not create only rights and obligations between the Contracting 
Parties. Instead it provides “transfer of sovereign rights to the intergovernmental institutions 
which it sets up”.10  
The CJEU’s interpretation of EU law is based on text, context, and telos (purpose), as can be 
read from the Van Gend en Loos judgment.
11
 The CJEU has also stated that in interpreting 
EU law concepts one should use “the generally recognized principles of interpretation, 
beginning with the ordinary meaning to be attributed to those terms in their context and in the 
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light of the objectives of the Treaty”.12 EU law provisions should also be interpreted in their 
context and in the light of the EU law as a whole.
13
 These elements of interpretation seem to 
be equivalent to those mentioned in the Article 31(1) VCLT, as explained above. So even 
though the VCLT is not a legal source of interpretation of EU law, similar rules of 
interpretation than those of the VCLT are recognized by the CJEU and can be used as an 
inspiration in EU law interpretation.  
Originally, reference to the preparatory work of the Treaties was considered constitutionally 
problematic. Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties envisages recourse 
to preparatory work of a treaty as a supplementary means of confirming an interpretation 
under Article 31 VCLT or to remove ambiguity of absurdity. This was ‘not a method which 
in the past commended itself to the Court’:14 the preparatory work did not exist, or involved 
only working group-level discussions, therefore rendering reference constitutionally 
questionable.
15
 Nevertheless Arnull, writing in 2006, expected the Court to become more 
amenable to using travaux as aids to interpretation: ‘Increasing pressure for transparency and 
the development of the internet have now brought many travaux préparatoires concerning 
subsequent amendments to the Treaties themselves into the public domain’.16 
…and the Court of Justice has not often relied on preparatory work. 
 
There is not much literature on the status of travaux préparatoires to the Treaties as the 
court’s source of law and interpretation. 17  This may be because it was categorically excluded 
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by the Court itself. In a classic exposition of this point from the mid-1970s, AG Mayras in the 
Reyners noted: 
‘the States, signatories to the Treaty of Rome, have themselves excluded all recourse 
to the preparatory work and it is very doubtful whether the reservations and 
declarations, inconsistent as they are, which have been relied upon can be regarded as 
constituting true preparatory work. Nor can they be held against the new Members of 
the enlarged [Union] by virtue of Accession. Above all [the Court of Justice itself has] 
rejected, on several occasions, recourse to such a method of interpretation by asserting 
the content and finality of the provisions of the Treaty’.18 
Thus, as main rule, the contextual and teleological interpretation methods are the chief 
methods for enhancing the Court’s understanding of Treaty texts. Teleology is in many cases 
derived from the Treaty text itself: when the preambular text refers to ever closer union, an 
interpretation which facilitates this is as has been pointed out only carrying out the literally 
stated intention of its drafters. Ambiguity also invites teleology: the strong position of the 
contextual and teleological interpretation stems at least partly from the problems arising from 
the multilingualism in the EU.
19
 Such ambiguity may also be an intentional outcome of the 
negotiation process.
20
 Sometimes the contextual and teleological methods can even override 
the natural textual meaning of the treaty provisions.
21
  
Despite the historical lack of historical interpretation, there have been some false starts. 
Literature has referred to two cases in which the Court is argued to have used the travaux as a 
source of law in its historically-oriented teleological interpretation.
 22
  These cases however, 
are not relevant in assessing the question at hand since one of the cases simply does not refer 
to the travaux of the Treaties.
23
 In the other case mentioned in the literature, the reference to 
the travaux is not made by the Court but instead by the applicant.
24
 In several cases either the 
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applicant or the defendant has relied on the alleged intention of the constitutional legislator 
that can be constructed from the preparatory works of the primary law, but the Court has not 
referred to the travaux in its reasoning.
25
 In some further cases the Court used the travaux of 
the primary law to interpret it, those concerning the acts concerning the conditions of 
accession to the Union.
26
 None of those are in fact references where the Court uses 
preparatory work to interpret the TFEU, TEU, or their predecessors. 
The Court now refers to preparatory work of the Treaties. 
Although travaux have not featured in either leading cases or legal literature on the EU 
Treaties, this position is changing. The Court now refers to the travaux of the Treaties. The 
three cases we examine reflect an entirely new line in the Court’s jurisprudence. The Court 
uses preparatory works to buttress arguments that are central in its reasoning. The three cases 
in which the Court refers to the travaux préparatoires are all fairly recent.  
Military uses of nuclear energy in EURATOM? 
 
The first of this line of judgments was given in 2005 and was about whether the military uses 
of nuclear energy could fall within the scope of the EURATOM Treaty.
27
 The Court first 
noted that articles 1 EA and 2 EA indicate that the Treaty objective is essentially civil and 
commercial, but that since the treaty provisions did not expressly exclude the military 
purposes it is essential to interpret the issue taking into account other factors than the text 
itself.
28
 Then the Court stated that taking into account the historical background of the Treaty 
is not sufficient, but nevertheless the CJEU took into account the travaux préparatoires 
which indicated clearly that the member states had differing views on the matter, and hence 
the Treaty could not be seen to be intended to cover military uses of nuclear energy.
29
 In the 
absence of a reference to military use, the difference in view led to the conclusion that no 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Convention, CONV 734/03) of 12 May 2003 and T-47/03 at 97, where Doc. CONV 850/03) states at Article III-
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bodies is recalled as part of NL arguments.    
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 See for example, case C-264/81 SpA Savna v Commission [1984], p. 3926. 
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42; T-247/07, para. 42; T-243/07, para. 42; T-324/05, para. 109. The trvaux had impact in cases C-273/04, para. 
57; T-493/93, para. 35-37. See for example cases T-493/93 Hansa-Fisch v Commission [1995], paras. 35–37; C-
273/04 Poland v Council [2007], para. 57. 
27
 Case C-61/03 Commission v the UK [2005] ECR I-2511, para. 25. 
28
 Ibid, paras 27–28. 
29
 ibid, para. 29.  
7 
 
such reference could be implied: “the Treaty is not applicable to uses of nuclear energy for 
military purposes”.30  In this case the Court began to build its argumentation starting from the 
historical interpretation concerning the intent of the Treaty’s drafters. The reference to the 
travaux was not decisive factor in the argumentation; instead the traditional CJEU 
interpretation paradigm of contextual and teleological (purposive) interpretation of the text 
gained more weight. The use of travaux was conservative and supplementary: it simply 
precluded implying an outcome that had clearly been the subject of disagreement during 
drafting.    
 
The ‘no bail-out clause’: intended only to ensure fiscal prudence, not prevent all 
assistance 
 
In the second case, the Pringle case, the CJEU referred to the travaux of the Maastricht 
Treaty, when it evaluated whether “an agreement such as the ESM Treaty is in breach of the 
‘no bail-out clause’ in Article 125 TFEU”.31 First the Court used textual method in 
interpreting the wording used in Article 125 TFEU, based on which the Court found that the 
article is not intended to prohibit granting of financial assistance to another Member State. 
Next the Court used contextual method, by referring to other articles concerning the 
economic policy, in particular Articles 122 TFEU and 123 TFEU, based on which it made the 
same conclusion than that based on textual interpretation. Only thirdly the Court examined 
the objective of the Article 125 TFEU. In order to be able to state the objective, the Court 
look into the preparatory works of the Maastricht Treaty, according to which “it is 
apparent…that the aim of Article 125 TFEU is to ensure that the Member States follow a 
sound budgetary policy”. Given this objective, it found the proposed European Stability 
Mechanism could be incompatible with that article if the conditions “to such assistance are 
such as to prompt that Member State to implement a sound budgetary policy.”32 The Court 
then noted that that since “the ESM and the Member States who participate in it are not liable 
for the commitments of a Member State which receives stability support and nor do they 
assume those commitments, within the meaning of Article 125 TFEU” it follows “that Article 
125 TFEU does not preclude either the conclusion by the Member States whose currency is 
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 Case C-370/12 Thomas Pringle v Ireland [2012], para. 135. 
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the euro of an agreement such as the ESM Treaty or their ratification of it”.33 In this case the 
travaux préparatoires had a decisive role in determining the question at hand, since the 
nature of the ESM mechanism was mirrored to the objective of the Article 125 TFEU to 
determine the appropriateness of the ESM mechanism. 
 
Judicial review for ‘regulatory acts’: what was intended by Treaty Revision? 
The present Treaties have been examined in the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami appeal, cited by the 
Court of Justice in its review of what was intended by the revision of Article 263 TFEU as 
regards ‘regulatory acts’ subject to review without individual concern.34 In Inuit, the CJEU 
notes that the interpretation of EU law requires not only taking into account the wording and 
the objectives of EU law provisions, but also their context within EU law as a whole. It 
approves reference to preparatory works: the origins of a provision “may also provide 
information relevant to its interpretation”.35  
The Court states that the authors of the Lisbon Treaty did not have intention to alter “the 
scope of the conditions of admissibility already laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 
230 EC… it is clear from the travaux préparatoires relating to Article III-365(4) of the 
proposed treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe that the scope of those conditions was 
not to be altered”.36  
In this case the Court made an important statement relative to the status of the travaux of the 
Treaties as a means of interpretation. Firstly, and most importantly, the Court explicitly stated 
in paragraph 50 of the judgment that the origins of a provision may also provide information 
relevant to the interpretation of EU law, including EU primary law. Although the documents 
left by its drafters are used in this instance, this evidence could conceivably be something 
else. Its reference to Pringle arguably establishes the pair as a line of cases rather than an 
anomalous occurrence. 
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Thus, regardless of the traditional view that travaux to EU Treaties are not relevant to their 
interpretation,
37
 it is clear they are relevant and should be reviewed. As AG Kokott explains 
in her Opinion in Inuit, “the practice of using conventions to prepare Treaty amendments” 
and “of publishing the mandates of intergovernmental conferences” entitle the Court to make 
greater use of the Treaties’ preparatory works: greater access to the proceedings encourages 
the travaux to be ‘utilised as a supplementary means of interpretation if, as in the present 
case, the meaning of a provision is still unclear having regard to its wording, the regulatory 
context and the objectives pursued’.38 
 
Introducing an analytical framework: features of constitutional 
reasoning with travaux 
Opening a new source of law for constitutional interpretation begs the question of what kind 
of impact such a change might have. Constitutional interpretation can have different 
outcomes depending on whether the constitution (here EU primary law) is seen as a finished 
product that can be changed only through amendments (as in skyskraper originalism) or as a 
framework for governance that can be complemented to fit to the existing circumstances over 
time where judiciaries can take part in the constitutional construction (framework 
originalism).
39
 This, in turn, relates to the question whether the constitutional interpretation 
simply ascertains in a static manner that certain line of interpretation corresponds what has 
been intended, or whether the constitutional interpretation results in the dynamic construction 
of the constitution by interpretation.
40
  
Constitutional interpretation can have static or dynamic effects. Static references to the 
travaux focus on the historical process of the constitution creation and the original purpose 
that can be found from the travaux. Static references to the travaux uphold the original 
constitutional idea behind the constitutional provisions. These references can either simply 
ascertain an interpretation that can be formed by means of textual interpretation 
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38
 Kokott in Inuit at para 32. Van Malleghem, Pieter-Augustijn, and Baeten, Niels, ‘before the law stands a 
gatekeeper – Or, what is a “regulatory act” in Article 263(4) TFEU? Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (2014) 51 
CMLREV 1187-1216 at 1204-1213, noting the  historic approach to interpretation as ‘something of a novelty’ at 
1204. 
39
 Jack M. Balkin, ’Framework originalism and the living constitution’ (Northwestern University Law Review, 
Vol, 103, No. 2, 2009), pp. 550–551.  
40
 Jack M. Balkin, ’Framework originalism and the living constitution’ (Northwestern University Law Review, 
Vol, 103, No. 2, 2009), pp. 559–560. 
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(static/ascertaining), or they can also be used to determine a meaning when the textual 
interpretation leaves ambiguity to the interpretation on what the original purpose of the 
provision is (static/extra value).  
Dynamic references to the travaux are also possible to filling gaps or constructing the 
constitution in other ways. Dynamic reference would thus justify constitutional change. For 
example, dynamic references could be used to justify certain constitutional interpretation in 
new circumstances that cannot have been seen in advance. In this example, dynamic 
reference to the travaux could justify stretching the reach of a constitutional provision by 
means of interpretation to cover the new circumstances.  
The table below can be drawn to illustrate the functions the travaux can have in constitutional 
interpretative framework by using the rules of interpretation as established in the VCLT in 
assistance: 
 STATIC 
- Aims to state the 
original purpose 
DYNAMIC 
- Aims to fil gaps or 
otherwise construct 
the constitution 
VCLT: “…to confirm the 
meaning…” 
Group 1: static/ascertaining Group 3: (hypothetical) 
VCLT: “…to determine the 
meaning, when meaning 
[would otherwise be] 
ambicious or obscure, absurd 
or unreasonable” 
Group 2: static/extra value 
 
 
Group 4: dynamic/change 
 
  
11 
 
In the three CJEU judgments examined here, the Court’s references support a static 
interpretation: the constitutional framework is reinforced, but not changed. Thus, the Court’s 
references to travaux do not engage in teleology beyond that already found in the relevant 
treaty provisions. However, in each of these cases, the references bring extra value to the 
textual interpretation. The references are not made simply to ascertain a fact that could be 
read from the constitutional text itself. This means that the references the Court makes belong 
to group 2 (static/extra value). 
 STATIC 
- Aims to state the 
original purpose 
DYNAMIC 
- Aims to fil gaps or 
otherwise construct 
the constitution 
VCLT: “…to confirm the 
meaning…” 
Group 1: static/ascertaining Group 3: (hypothetical) 
VCLT: “…to determine the 
meaning, when meaning 
[would otherwise be] 
ambicious or obscure, absurd 
or unreasonable” 
Group 2: static/extra value 
 
C-61/03 (EURATOM) 
C-370/12 (Pringle) 
C-583/11 P (Inuit) 
Group 4: dynamic/change 
  
12 
 
Travaux references in AG opinions: identifying a new trend? 
Before the Court of Justice itself recognised travaux, the preparatory documents of the 
Convention and subsequent IGCs have been cited in a dozen or so documents. In the 
immediate aftermath of the Convention, Advocates General attempted to introduce travaux as 
material for constitutional interpretation.
41
 However, after a false start hobbled by the failure 
of the Constitutional Treaty, references begin anew after the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty.  
Here, as above, the majority of references tend to support a line of reasoning that does not 
require the documents. In one category of cases, the references are entirely trivial. In another, 
they explain changes to the Treaties, and the purpose of those Treaty changes, but still remain 
static in nature. But arguably some of these references may employ a more dynamic 
approach: The Advocate General adds a category of instrument to an international 
competence of the Union that is recast in the Treaty. In this case an argument could perhaps 
be made that the legal rule is derived not primarily from a textual interpretation of the 
Treaties but comes in large part as a consequence of a creative and even teleological 
interpretation of the new text – one whose teleology is found in the travaux. In this sense the 
last opinion we examine aims at a dynamic constitutional construction, an outcome which it 
reaches by the reference to the travaux.  
Some references are trivial  
 
First, the mundane. One class of Opinions refers to Working Group documents, but in 
arguably only the most trivial and superficial ways which do not genuinely contribute to the 
legal outcome in the opinion.  In the Biocides case,
42
 AG Villalon refers to a Convention 
Working Group document
43
 and claims that the drafters had in mind comparisons of national 
administrative legal systems when discussing what ‘delegated’ legislation, now in Article 291 
TFEU, should mean.
44
  They surely did so, but the document to which he refers makes no 
mention of this comparison.  
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 In the C-102/02 Beuttenmüller Opinion, AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer of 16.9.2003 at point 12 fn 10 referring 
modestly to the drafting of the new freedom of movement objectives in the Treaty, Draft Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe (Article 8(2), first indent; CONV 820/03, 797/1/03 REV 1. 
42
 C-427/12, opinion of AG Villalon 19.12.2013, point 38 fn 16.  
43
 Final report of Working Group IX on Simplification of 29 November 2002, CONV 424/02, WG IX 13. 
44
 “However sui generis the system of Union acts may ultimately have become, as a result of its very nature and 
its history, (15) in cases where the European Union has sought inspiration from the normative categories of the 
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In his opinion on enhanced cooperation for the unitary patent,
45
 AG Bot refers to a 
Praesidium note (so not a final working group report).
46
 He uses this to support an intention 
to clarify competences in the Treaty revision: ‘At the European Councils of Nice, in 2000, 
and Laeken, in 2001, the Member States clearly expressed their desire that the sharing of 
competence between the Union and the Member States be clarified’.47 That the Convention 
was framed by the Laeken declaration objective is hardly a legal innovation. 
In C-95/12 Commission v Germany (second infringement case concerning the German 
worker representation law), it had been claimed that the Commission had not pursued its case 
against the Member State efficiently, and that this precluded an action under Article 260. In 
accepting the established position that infringement proceedings do not have to be brought 
within a particular time, but involve a large amount of discretion, AG Wahl mulled evidence 
to the contrary. Travaux were referred to in this context – as evidence considered, but not 
sufficient to persuade the AG: AG Wahl acknowledges that the purpose of reforming the 
infringement systems was inspired also by a need for speedy action also in infringement 
proceedings brought by the Commission.
48
  
 
The majority support, but do not found legal propositions 
 
A large bulk of the references involve attempts to support legal propositions that are not 
wholly founded on the preparatory works but which are clearly augmented by them. This is 
the case for all three of our CJEU judgments at earlier stages, whether at first instance 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Member States, (16) as was no doubt the case here, it is almost natural that they should be looked into, even 
though there is no guarantee as to the result.” 
45
 C-274/11 Spain v Council (enhanced cooperation) Opinion of AG Bot of 11.12.2012 at point 43, fn 8, 
46
 Note from the Praesidium of 15 May 2002 on the ‘Delimitation of competence between the European Union 
and the Member States – Existing system, problems and avenues to be explored’ (CONV 47/02) 
47
 point 43. 
48
AG Wahl, C-95/12  on 29.5.2013 at point 84 fn60 referring to Secretariat of the European Convention, ‘Final 
report of the discussion circle on the Court of Justice’, document CONV 636/03, paragraph 28 
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(Inuit)
49
 or the opinions of the Advocates general before the CJEU (EURATOM,
50
 Inuit
51
  
and Pringle
52
).  
In Telefonica,
53
 AG Kokott attempts to interpret what the Treaty annulment grounds refer to 
when Article 263 TFEU refers to an act which does not entail implementing measures.
54
 Her 
references to the legislative history of that provision, namely the Court of Justice discussion 
circle in the Convention,
55
 are used to support two points. First, she observes that a [prior, but 
not final?] German version of the Treaty provision translates as similar to the current French 
text
56
.  
A second reference to the same document is then used to divine the ‘intention’ behind the 
words ‘implementing measures’ in that same revision: why must regulatory measures that can 
be challenged without individual concern, as ordinary legislative acts, be ones which do not 
entail implementing measures? The text of the preparatory document provides an express 
claim: “The addition of ‘implementing measures’ was intended to ensure that the extension of 
the right to institute proceedings was restricted to cases where an individual ‘must first 
infringe the law before he can have access to a court’.”57 
In the ESMA short selling rules opinion,
58
 AG Jääskinen also refers to a Convention Final 
Working Group document.
59
 In this case, the reference simply refers to the legislative history 
and identifies that the distinction came from the working group; it does not seek to claim a 
specific interpretation based on that document. Subsequent references to literature reflect on 
points which are also covered in the Working group document, but which is not referred to 
for additional support. 
                                                          
49
 T-18/10, ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber, Extended Composition) 6 September 
2011 at 49. 
50
 C-61/03 AG Geelhoed at 80-82, referring to the Travaux of the EURATOM treaty in a similar fashion as the 
CJEU in its judgment. 
51
 C-583/11 P Inuit, AG Kokott at 40, using several documents in the drafting history to define ‘regulatory act’ 
s; at 46, noting the complete absence of counterevidence.  
52
 C-370/12 Pringle, AG Kokott’s view of 26.10.2012 at 128-131. 
53
 C-274/12 P Telefónica SA v European Commission Opinion of AG Kokott 21 March 2013. 
54
 points 30-57. 
55
 Secretariat of the European Convention, Final Report of the discussion circle on the Court of Justice of 25 
March 2003 (Document CONV 636/03, paragraph 21. 
56
 para 38 fn 17, referring to Secretariat of the European Convention, Final Report of the discussion circle on the 
Court of Justice of 25 March 2003 (Document CONV 636/03, paragraph 21). 
57
 AG Kokott, para 40, referring in fn 19, to Secretariat of the European Convention, Final Report of the 
discussion circle on the Court of Justice, paragraph 21. 
58
 C-270/12 UK v EP and Council (ESMA), Opinion of AG Jääskinen of 12.09.2013 at 75 fn 95. 
59
 Final report of Working Group IX on Simplification of 29 November 2002, CONV 424/02, WG IX 13, p. 10-
12. 
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In the Broadcasting Rights Convention Case, 
60
 AG Sharpston reviewed both the a Working 
Group document as well as a mandate for an intergovernmental conference that eventually 
led to the Lisbon Treaty in order to examine whether the new exclusivity clause in Article 
3(2) TFEU intended to depart from the ERTA test for exclusivity from which its language is 
borrowed.
61
  ‘If the negotiating history of Article 3(2) TFEU shows anything, it is that there 
was no intention to depart from the ERTA principle.’62  
In the Anton Las opinion,
63
 AG Jääskinen refers to the origins of the current ‘national 
identity’ provision in Article 4(2) TEU. A European Convention working group had 
recommended that the provisions now in TEU on national identity should have been clarified 
to expressly state that the EU is obliged to respect ‘essential elements of the national identity 
[which] include… their choices as to language’.64 Jääskinen’s point is simply that, since the 
clarification was mooted, ‘[t]he concept of ‘national identity’ therefore concerns the choices 
made as to the languages used at national or regional level.’ This clarification was not made – 
language is not currently mentioned in 4(2) TEU – but the Court recognised it as part of the 
concept in its Runevic-Vardun and Wardyn judgment.
65
 However, had the Court followed the 
Advocate General, it would have not led to an outcome that favoured the language choices of 
the state: Jääskinen instead compared his enhanced concept of national identity with the 
concept of linguistic diversity, with the effect that Jääskinen would have denied the 
possibility of derogating from fundamental freedoms on these (national identity) grounds.  
Could Travaux introduce new propositions of law? 
 
So far, advocates general have not used travaux in a particularly controversial way. They 
support propositions of law or are trivial but are not solely responsible for founding them. 
However, under one reading, the recent Venezuelan Fisheries case could be considered quite 
unusual – and one where the travaux would have clearly augmented the Treaty text.  
                                                          
60
 C-114/12, Opinion of AG Sharpston, 3.4.2014 para. 96 fn 55. 
61
 reaching for the Final report of Working Group VII on External Action CONV 459/02 (16 December 2002), 
paragraph 18 and the IGC 2007 Mandate POLGEN 74 (26 June 2007),  paragraph 18 and footnote 10 to 
determine whether 3(2) TFEU meant to depart from the ERTA ruling principle; 
62
 Opinion of AG Sharpston, 3.4.2014 para 96 fn 55 reaching for the Final report of Working Group VII on 
External Action CONV 459/02 (16 December 2002), paragraph 18 and the IGC 2007 Mandate POLGEN 74 (26 
June 2007),  paragraph 18 and footnote 10 to determine whether 3(2) TFEU meant to depart from the ERTA 
ruling principle; see also her reference to AG Kokott in C-137/12,   
63
 C-202/11  Las Opinion of AG Jääskinen of 12.7.2012 at point 59 fn 39 
64
 CONV 375/1/02 REV 1 Final report of working group V, p. 12. 
65
 Case C-39/09 Runevič‑Vardyn and Wardyn, paragraph 86. 
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In Venezuelan Fisheries, AG Sharpston examined i.a. the effects of the EU’s new legal 
personality on the legal rules which governed its international action.
66
 It was suggested that 
the Union could not make unilateral declarations, but could only enter into ‘international 
agreements’ under Article 218 TFEU. According to Sharpston’s reading of the Convention 
WG final report on legal personality,
67
 the reasons for attributing legal personality entitled the 
Union to also issue unilateral declarations which bound it under international law. By making 
the Union a subject, it would be  
“… be able to avail itself of all means of international action (right to conclude 
treaties, right of legation, right to submit claims or to act before an international court 
or judge, right to become a member of an international organisation or become a party 
to international conventions, e.g. the ECHR, right to enjoy immunities), as well as to 
bind the Union internationally” 
Thus, although the Treaties did not expressly envisage unilateral declarations, here AG 
Sharpston would have implied the power in part through a construction based on the WG 
final report’s intention to grant the Union full capacity as an international actor. This could be 
seen as a dynamic reference, since the immediate outcome is to augment the categories of 
legal instruments with declarations in international law. 
Applying the framework to AG opinions 
References to the travaux in the AG opinions can be categorized in following way: (next 
page) 
  
                                                          
66
 Joined cases C-103/12 and C-65/13, Opinion of AG Sharpton on 15.05.2014 point 102 fn 61. 
67
 Final report of Working Group III on Legal Personality CONV 305/02 (WG III 16) (Brussels, 1 October 
2002), paragraph 19. 
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 STATIC 
- Aims to state the 
original purpose 
DYNAMIC 
- Aims to fil gaps or 
otherwise construct 
the constitution 
VCLT: “…to confirm the 
meaning…” 
Group 1: static/ascertaining 
Trivial references: 
AG in C-427/12  
AG in C-274/11 
AG in C-95/12 
Ascertaining references: 
AG in C-274/12 P 
AG in C-270/12 
AG in C-114/12 
AG in C-202/11 
Group 3: (hypothetical) 
VCLT: “…to determine the 
meaning, when meaning 
[would otherwise be] 
ambigious or obscure, absurd 
or unreasonable” 
Group 2: static/extra value 
References to clarify 
ambigious meanings: 
AG in C-61/03 (EURATOM) 
AG in C-370/12 (Pringle) 
AG in 583/11 P (Inuit) 
 
Group 4: dynamic/change 
References to propose a 
constitutional construction 
by interpretation: 
AG in Joined Cases C-
103/12 and C-65/13 (to fil a 
“constituonal gap”) 
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Conclusions: on the use and abuse of travaux 
Even though the older preparatory works of the Treaties might not have been widely reported 
or published, the travaux préparatoires of the more recent Treaty amendments, such as the 
Constitutional Treaty and the IGC leading to the Lisbon Treaty, are rather well documented. 
Perhaps the proper publication of the travaux gives the CJEU a proper mandate to use them 
as a source of law, as the Pringle and Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami cases demonstrate.  But do the 
travaux préparatoires really reflect a coherent intention of the drafters? And if not, how far 
do their use turn legal fiction into fact? 
 
Current practice is conservative despite admitting travaux 
 
The three cases show that preparatory works can now be used, but whilst Pringle in particular 
has raised vocal dissent, this specific aspect – that is, the use of preparatory works to interpret 
the meaning of a Treaty provision – is less controversial in each. The EURATOM 
interpretation case shows one example of how travaux could be used to support cautious or 
conservative readings of implied powers. There, discussion in the preparatory works showed 
that military use was not omitted by accident: the possibility of including this in the 
EURATOM Treaty was rejected. That rejection was then confirmed when the Court was 
pressed to rule on this point. In Pringle, it is hardly contested that a key purpose of the no 
bail-out clause was indeed to ensure prudent macroeconomic governance. Whether that 
provision should therefore also preclude the ESM is not decisively determined by the 
travaux, but by the court’s appreciation of the effects of the ESM on this prudence. In Inuit, 
the travaux reference is also limited to confirming the relatively unopposed interpretation of 
Treaty change: the preparatory works in question clearly illustrate the origins of the 
distinction between regulatory and legislative acts – one also mooted by the Court’s own 
discussion group at the time of the Constitutional Convention. This is then confirmed by the 
Court’s interpretation of the provision in Inuit.68  
 
                                                          
68
 See also Bergström, C F, ‘Defending Restricted Standing for Individuals to Bring Direct Actions Against 
‘Legislative’ Measures: Court of Justice of the European Union Decision of 3 October 2013 in Case C-583/11 P, 
Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Parliament and Council’ (2014) European Constitutional Law 
Review 481 at 496-497 
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…but reference to the intentions of drafters is open to abuse 
 
Koen Lenaerts, the president of the Court which handed down Inuit, suggests the travaux will 
be increasingly influential as the current Treaty provisions are interpreted.
69
 However, some 
doubts might be raised about the utility of travaux references. Many of the criticisms that 
have been levelled against the use of preparatory work to secondary legislation apply also to 
the Treaties’ preparatory work, and in some cases even more strongly. 
Schønberg and Frick’s 2003 review of travaux in secondary legislation70 noted that the 
conflicting intentions and statements of co-legislators made it difficult to identify a single 
coherent intent; that a historical intention could ossify interpretation (think- what could the 
founders possibly have said about interstate electronic commerce?); and finally, that the 
drafting of the documents themselves could be so ambiguous as to preclude drawing 
conclusions as to what was intended. 
The question of is whose intent matters is especially acute in the context of the Treaties. The 
input ranging from the Convention working groups, its plenaries, those involved in the legal 
review of the draft treaties, the intergovernmental conferences leading up to the 
reconfiguration of the texts in the Lisbon Treaty all offer reasons for questioning claims as to 
intention. Negotiators involved in the proceedings may, if interviewed, give diametrically 
opposed views of what was intended by particular Treaty provisions. National 
parliamentarians approving changes may hold particular views on what is intended. 
Significant differences of opinion are evident at various stages of the legislative processes.
71
 
And what weight should be given to the way in which Treaty changes are marketed in the 
national referenda ? Can we – and should we – also measure what is intended by those 
readers of the drafts, without whom many changes cannot be ratified? The European union, 
like all legal systems, has its share of legal fictions. But is it too bold to claim that an 
intention can be identified in preparatory works? And do only written, contemporaneous 
documents of particular bodies matter, or should the entirety of the evidence be considered? 
                                                          
69
 Lenaerts, Koen and Gutierrez-Fons, ‘To Say What the Law of the EU is: Methods of Interpretation and the 
European Court of Justice’ EUI Working Paper 2013/9, p. 19-24  
70
 Schønberg, S. and Frick, K.,  ‘Finishing, Refining, Polishing: On the Use of travaux preparatoires as an Aid to 
the Interpretation of Community Legislation’ (2003) 28 European Law Review 149. 
71
 Miettinen NJECL 2013 99-119 at 106-113 on EAW preparatory work.  
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The clarity of preparatory works may also leave much to be desired, even in the post-Lisbon 
era. In our primary field of research, a major topic of inquiry is the extent and limits of 
legislative powers in the field of criminal law. Has the Union exhausted its competence for 
criminal legislation in Article 83 TFEU, or might similar provisions be founded on other 
legal bases?
72
 This appeared to be a major discussion point during the negotiations. 
Nevertheless, the whole body of evidence led the UK House of Lords to conclude at the time 
that a question on which it both required an answer (so as to ensure the effectiveness of its 
‘opt-out’) and that it did not know the answer.73  
The mere possibility of referring to the travaux also complicates this issue. The EU Treaties 
in their current form are hardly a glowing example of clarity, either in length or in style. The 
possibility that these ambiguities might now require clarification in the form of exponentially 
greater, and less clear, combinations of preparatory works should be additional cause for 
concern. When will they be instrumental to the outcome, and when will they be ignored? It is 
tempting to echo Gareth Davies’s very recent conclusion on Court’s approach to legislative 
change: ‘in situations where the Treaty is involved, which are almost all the ones that matter, 
the legislature has no capacity to force the law in a certain direction’ since the Court’s 
interpretative powers are so vast.
74
 Growing emphasis on travaux will be uncontroversial if 
they merely confirm the lack of agreement, or an unanimously agreed interpretation. 
However, the capacity for abuse is immense – especially in the nightmare scenario where  
even the drafters of the Treaty cannot prevail over the interpretation suggested by a reading 
of particular preparatory works.  
Could Travaux be used in a dynamic way? 
 
What impact have the Court’s references to the travaux préparatoires of the Treaties had so 
far? Do the references help identify the intention of the constitutional legislators (the Member 
States as the Masters of the Treaties), or are they a dynamic constitution-building exercise? 
Thus far the Court itself has used the travaux préparatoires in a static manner. It determines 
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 on the inconclusiveness of the Convention evidence on drafting, Miettinen, Samuli, ‘Implied ancillary 
criminal law competence after Lisbon’ European Criminal Law Review (2013)  3(2) 194-219. On the difference 
of EU law paradigm with the choice of legal basis-doctrine and the normative criminal law paradigm, see Merita 
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 HOUSE OF LORDS European Union Committee 10th Report of Session 2007–08 The Treaty of Lisbon: an 
impact assessment  Volume I: Report, paras 6.179-6.189 pp-147-149; Mitsilegas EU Criminal Law 108 fn 267 
for reference to lex specialis. 
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 at 1606. 
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the original intention of the constitutional legislator in situations in which the text itself 
would not give satisfactory solution. Instead, it looks to the preparatory work which supports 
a teleological interpretation - the intention of the constitutional legislator which can. This 
differs from the Court’s general line of teleological jurisprudence, which is highly dynamic. 
The Court appears reluctant to refer to travaux when they provide no added value. When the 
travaux confirm evidence also found elsewhere, they are omitted by the Court of Justice. The 
Court’s travaux references also, so far, lead to conservative outcomes. In the three cases in 
which the Court does follow Advocate Generals in referring to travaux, both the Advocates 
General and the Court use travaux in a static way. A particular Treaty interpretation is 
supported- the text is clarified and this provides added value – but the reference does not 
propose a construction that is developed exclusively by interpretation. 
There is one outlier in this set. In Venezuelan Fisheries, AG Sharpston used the preparatory 
works in a different- arguably dynamic – way. In the approach she adopts, the Union is 
granted competence to give unilateral declarations: this constitutional construction would 
have granted the Union a general competence to issue internationally binding unilateral 
declarations. This goes well beyond the bilateral nature of ‘agreements’ stipulated in the text 
of the Treaty. The Court did not follow AG Sharpston’s suggestion even though it reaches the 
same substantive outcome. It simply construed the exchange of positions as an ‘agreement’ 
and thus prevented the need to consider powers to issue any purely unilateral declarations.
75
  
We conclude that thus far the Court has used the travaux in a static manner. The Court has 
not exercised dynamic constitution building based on refernces to the travaux. This does not 
mean, however, that the Court’s new line of interpretation using the travaux of the Treaties 
could not be used in a dynamic manner in the future. Further research is required on when 
this might be appropriate. 
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 C-103/12, paragraph 73. 
